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Abstract
There is a compelling argument that universities should be committed to advancing the
Indigenous agenda. With respect to social work, as well as to nursing, psychology, and
allied health, this commitment is often translated into a single goal: that graduates
should be ‘‘culturally competent’’. While acknowledging that there can be tactical
advantages in pursuing this goal the current paper develops a practical critique of the
expectation that cultural competence is an unproblematic ‘‘add on’’ to professional
education. Using a single case study as an example*how the subject ‘‘individual
development’’ is transmitted as a monocultural and unproblematic formation*we
argue that it is impossible to learn to work cross-culturally without developing a capacity
for reflective self-scrutiny. Less likely to be a flag of convenience than ‘‘cultural
competence’’, an allegiance to ‘‘critical awareness’’ prompts the interrogation of received
knowledge, for example how human development and personhood is understood, as well
stimulating an engagement in the lifelong process of reflecting on one’s own ideological
and cultural location.
Keywords: Critical Social Work; Crosscultural Social Work; Culturally Sensitive Social
Work
The construct cultural competence has achieved a highly positive status in its very
brief career. Developed over less than two decades, this prestige can be found in a
variety of settings. These contexts include funding bodies, the large health and human
services organisations they regulate, as well a number of key professional streams
within the tertiary sector. In the latter arena, it is now expected that disciplines such
as social work, nursing, psychology, and the health sciences will graduate
practitioners with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that realise cultural competence
as a standard for professional practice (Burton, Westen, & Kowalski, 2009; O’Hagen,
2001; Weaver, 2005). Despite this popularity, some elaborations of the construct are
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narrow, even tokenistic. For example, Purnell (2009) presents summations of the
knowledge professionals require to practice competently with 26 ethnic groups in a
single, modestly scaled textbook. More appropriately, there are texts that offer a
richer, more nuanced engagement (e.g., Ranzijn, McConnochie, & Nolan, 2009). This
latter text explores the ‘‘foundations of cultural competence’’ for professionals who
practice with Indigenous Australians, mindful that there is tremendous diversity
among the many cultures included in the larger Indigenous population.
Further, some depictions of cultural competence proceed on the basis that the
construct can be behaviourally specified, that it can, and ought to be, delivered as an
‘‘add on’’ to the received professional practice. Other versions are far more radical
and insist that the form professional practices have long conformed to*that an
expert knows best about, and then instructs, an ignorant and passive client*has to
be systemically remodelled. That is, the composition of the construct, its conceptual
nature, remains the prompt for serious debate.
Despite such definitional and operational uncertainties, the goal of cultural
competence continues to present attractively. For example, to many the term is
appealing as it has both momentum and a progressive intent. This is a rare
combination in fields that often struggle to gain funding and policy attention. This
attractiveness stems from the apparent practicality of the construct*it is a
‘‘competence’’ after all*yet alongside this muscularity there is also rhetorical appeal:
how could it be disputed that a practitioner, or a service, should not be culturally
competent? Like the term ‘‘case management’’, there is a linguistic binary in play
where the intuitive rejection of the reverse*that the mismanagement of cases is
unacceptable, just as cultural incompetence is inappropriate*is taken to mean there
must be an essence of good sense present. Cultural competence may lack conceptual
coherence, yet it is hard to fault as a slogan and international flag of convenience.
With this background in mind, the current exercise sets out to develop an
emphatic criticism of cultural competence as a skill that can be learnt. In order to
illustrate this argument, we focus on one test site: the stand alone subject most often
termed ‘‘human development’’. This subject is generally imported from psychology
and is referenced as an objective, specialist knowledge, even though speculative
theorists (e.g., Erikson, 1980; Maslow, 1970) are often central to its content. The
theme we focus on in this review, and in the argument that is advanced more broadly,
is that of identity and selfhood: how is the self rendered in the defining texts of
culture and the various professional disciplines that serve this culture?
Rather than using or retaining cultural competence as the flag of allegiance, two
reasons for preferring critical awareness are introduced: (a) an attitude of critical
awareness encourages the practitioner to work to the principles of ‘‘curiosity’’ and of
an ‘‘informed not knowing’’; and (b) this orientation establishes a context for practice
that regards ‘‘the other’’ as a mirror upon which the practitioner can see the outline
of their own personal, professional, ideological, and cultural profile. Although
we believe there is a recursive relationship between these conditions, we address each
of them serially as if they are linear constructs. Initially, attention is given to the larger
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question of culture*with what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973, p. xi)
referred to as the means by which people ‘‘communicate, perpetuate and develop
their knowledge about attitudes towards life. Culture is the fabric of meaning in terms
of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action’’.
Thinking About Culture:
The Characteristic Pattern Language of Western Thought
During the making of the Australian film Ten Canoes, the Director, Rolf de Heer (as
cited in Martin, 2008), remarked that English is a language of division and category,
while he believed that Aboriginal languages are those of inclusiveness and
connectedness. Broadly, what is characteristic of our accepted language practices,
and to a degree Western thinking more generally, is an emphasis on decontextualis-
ing. Accepted modes of thought literally separate persons from each other and
persons from their environment: actors are separated from their context in such a
way as to assume the person can act unilaterally upon an inert ‘‘background’’. This
cultural practice puts personal agency into focus as a positive figure-and-ground
configuration. It can be contrasted with Australian Indigenous languages that, at least
according to informal accounts, generally do not have a free-standing word for
the ‘‘I’’*the individualised single actor. Rather, there is ‘‘I-in-relation-to-a-stranger’’,
‘‘I-in-relation-to-a-male-elder’’, ‘‘I-in-relation-to-my-land’’, and so forth. Compared
with this relational complexity, English is impoverished: English speakers have a ‘‘deaf
ear’’ to the nuances of relationship.
Even when compared to the relatively simple distinction between the French ‘‘tu’’
and ‘‘vous’’, pronouns that are used to signify either familiarity or formality, English
no longer retains any differentiation (the use of ‘‘thee’’ and ‘‘thou’’ has not persisted
into the twentieth century). This relational featurelessness extends to the impover-
ished vocabulary there is in English to describe the nuances of extended family
connection, and also with respect to the courtesies of nonfamilial everyday social
interaction, compared to more elaborated signing systems. For example, in Arabic
there are distinctive terms to distinguish maternal and paternal relations, a practice
that maintains an everyday awareness of the nature of these relationships, whereas in
English the generic terms ‘‘uncle’’ and ‘‘aunt’’ are used, a practice that tends to wash-
out such delineations (Vygotsky, 1978).
The linguistic patterns present in a language do not determine the nature of
culture or personal experience, as surely as it is crudely polarising to see the world in
terms of individualist and collectivist cultures. Moreover, unless one is a discursive
determinist, it does not necessarily follow that, because English is a relationally
unsophisticated language, all English-speaking people will be relationally coarse.
Nevertheless, it may be true that it is a poor generalisation to say that English
speakers are relationally insensitive or, in so far as this is a reasonable generalisation,
that this may be the result of variables related to nonlinguistic factors (e.g., gender,
generation, class, geographical location).
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These important qualifications having been noted, one of the strong suits of the
English language, set out as a feature in the architectural floor plan, is that English is
good at drawing attention to, and in effect therefore privileging, interpersonal
separation and the possibilities of individual action. This is in contrast to those
languages that tend to elaborate, and therefore facilitate, an attention to matters of
connectedness, a condition that tends to constrain unilateral individual action. Thus,
as the actual terms within which I/we think as Western cultural subjects*about
proprieties and priorities for example*are taken from a privatising, rather than a
connective, language. The result of this is that the structure of modern thought tends
to take place within an idiom of ‘‘individualisation’’ (Bauman, 2001, 2003; Beck &
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 2002). Within this idiom, personal agency and
personal boundaries are valorised (‘‘You are not me’’; ‘‘Each person is supposed to be
in charge of her/his own life’’), just as emotions are privatised (Little, 1999).
However, this particular cultural form is not universal. On the contrary, it reflects
specifically postindustrial, late capitalist assumptions*a set of premises that are
almost sacred cows to those who have naturalised their apparent sense*yet they are
also problematic. Tromenaars and Hamden-Turner (2002) argued that the ‘‘first
world’’ belief, that each person is a separate entity, is an example of an embedded
presupposition, namely, a ‘‘core assumption about existence’’. These authors further
contended that the ‘‘best way to test if something is a basic assumption is when . . .
question[ing this example] provokes confusion or irritation’’ (p. 23). Asked if it is
true that each adult is expected to be autonomous and self-determining, self-reliant,
and in charge of his/her own life, well-adjusted Western democratic citizens would
tend to have the same reaction: ‘‘this question has such an obvious answer. Maybe,
there is a trick: what is really being asked here’’?
The Psychology of Separation:
Critiquing the Received Knowledge of a Discipline
For more than 25 years, the scientific literature has presented citations that argue
selfhood is not necessarily, or is even preferably, considered monolithic. For example,
Heelas and Lock (1981, p. 33) concluded that the liberal-democratic assumption that
the self is independent is not only not axiomatic, it is historically and culturally
anomalous. Far from this understanding being unproblematic, these authors argued
that the assumption that the self is, and should be, autonomous and self determining
is more accurately understood as a key element within the ‘‘Indigenous psychology’’
of a particular time and place*that of (so-called) first world societies (e.g., Australia
and the USA) during the late twentieth/early twenty-first century. Within anthro-
pology, and to an extent psychology, this idea is commonly discussed with reference
to the dimension of ‘‘Individualism/Collectivism’’  a dimension that Gergen (1994),
Hofstede, (2001), Triandis (1995), Tromenaars and Hamden-Turner (2002), and
many others have theorised about and empirically investigated.
Australian Social Work 41
Reflecting on the faux universal status that has been accorded to personal
autonomy, DiNicola (1997, p. 199) simply observed that ‘‘independence is a myth’’, a
folk story, that a minority culture*the so-called developed West*espouses and tries
to export to the rest of the world. That is, in each historical period, and in each
particular culture, a particular understanding of selfhood will be naturalised as the
single truth. Thus, there are many anthropologies, many psychologies and, it so
happens, the specific example with which the English-speaking public is most
familiar*and assumed to be the only one*turns out to have no valid claim to an
ascendant or universal status.
Mindful that the current exercise can only work to outline a case, what is
characteristic of the ‘‘indigenous psychology’’ of the liberal democracies? Responding
to this question comparatively, the anthropologist Louis Dumont (1986) concluded
that: ‘‘Western ideology grants real existence only to individuals and not to relations,
to elements and not to sets of elements’’ (p. 9). Clearly, Dumont used the term
‘‘ideology’’, rather than ‘‘Indigenous psychology’’, in this quote. Yet, for a summary
purpose it is provocative to substitute the term ‘‘ideology’’ for ‘‘Indigenous
psychology’’. We say this because we think it is likely that there is compelling
interpenetration between these (supposedly distinct) realms. For example, neo-liberal
ideology idealises the values of personal autonomy, self-reliance, choice, and privacy,
and these same values have a similar totemic status within the ‘‘Indigenous
psychology’’ present in North America, Western Europe, and Australasia. For
example, in the case of the ‘‘Indigenous psychology’’ present in these countries, it
is assumed that the end-point of human development can be specified using almost
exactly the same terms as are found in neo-liberal ideology: the well-adjusted is
expected to be autonomous, self-reliant, in-charge, to have clear private boundaries,
make personal decisions, and so forth.
That the ideological domain is not distinct from what is supposedly objective and
technical should not surprise. This is perhaps particularly the case when the point at
issue is concerned with how personhood should be positively, and negatively,
specified, as this question is of abiding concern in each domain. According to Elliot
and Lemert (2006), the ‘‘master idea’’ for neo-liberal culture is that of ‘‘in-
dividualisation’’*a specific ascription of personhood, which privileges autonomy
and denigrates dependence. That economically advanced, postmodern societies have
become enchanted with ‘‘the dream of the autonomous subject’’ (Furlong, 2007) is
clear, or at least it is becoming increasingly evident.
To return our focus to the matter of cultural competence: having established that,
on a conceptual level the status of personal autonomy is, at least, contested, and the
cultures and personal characteristics of Indigenous Australians tend to be collectivist
rather than individualistic, it is not possible to simply ‘‘add on’’ a unit on cultural
competence without also critically reviewing the greater part of the received
knowledge embedded in the discipline that relates to personhood, human
development, and the categories of personal health and pathology. Given that a
stipulated subject in Australian social work is psychology, and that ‘‘human
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development’’ is usually sourced from this discipline, this offers a clear starting
point. O’Brien (1981) referred to those conceptual practices that take up a
‘‘masculinist’’ perspective*what we refer to as the psychology of separation*can
be termed ‘‘male stream’’. It is this meaning that has been used to frame the following
critique.
Critiquing ‘‘Male-Stream’’ Psychology
In Psychology: Australian and New Zealand (Burton et al., 2009), Maslow’s (1970)
‘‘hierarchy of human needs’’ is presented as a foundational truth. This account
stipulates that humans must satisfy each stage of human need (e.g., food, shelter,
companionship) before they can ascend the hierarchy towards the realisation of their
potential for ‘‘self-actualisation’’. Burton et al. (2009, p. 39) state that Maslow
understood self actualisation as ‘‘the prime motivator of all human behaviour is self-
actualisation, [which is] an innate tendency that we all have, towards growth and the
fulfilment of our potential’’ (emphasis added). Further, Burton et al. (2009) recycled
the following, that:‘‘self-actualised individuals are no longer preoccupied with
[whether they will get] dinner or who will hold them in esteem, and are thus free
to pursue moral, cultural or aesthetic concerns . . . [as did] Mahatma Ghandi, Martin
Luther King, and Mother Theresa’’ (p. 372).
How did Maslow discover this truth? Did he use double blind trials and employ the
random allocation of subjects in his experiments? Did he, in fact, discover the
hierarchy of needs in any scientific sense at all? On the contrary, Maslow simply
thought-up his hypothesis, and then wrote it down as a ‘‘finding’’. Not that he was an
ordinary speculator: he was a prestigious, confident, male psychology academic who
wrote in the USA in the 1960s. Putting his privileged status to one side, an
elementary scrutiny reveals his (so-called) findings lack empirical support. Rather,
they represent ideological, or even pseudo-religious, values more than they reflect the
rigour of recognised scientific protocol. A closer examination only intensifies this
scepticism: Maslow’s (1943) first iteration proposed that there were five levels of
human need; then, for a less than empirical reason, the depiction evolved into six,
then to seven, levels of need, before finally being increased to eight in a posthumous
improvement proposed by Maslow’s devoted followers. Bizarrely, despite this
updating the need for friendship and love, like food and shelter, are still thought
of as ‘‘deficit needs’’.
Interestingly, despite its title, the greater part of the Burton et al. (2009) text is not
drawn from Australian sources. On the contrary, this text is the authorised
adaptation of an established imperial text: Westen’s (2008) Psychology: Brain
Behaviour and Culture. Much more worryingly, it should be noted that self-
actualisation is not necessarily associated with what is positive and prosocial.
Although the authors chose to cite Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King, and
Mother Theresa as examples of the self-actualised being, it should be expected that
an entity who is unrestrained by the opinions of others could just as easily act
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amorally and pursue self-interested projects in commercial, sexual, or even criminal
domains.
More broadly, the truth claim put forward by Maslow (1970), which has been
promulgated fecklessly by Burton et al. (2009), among a larger group of
psychologists, is terminally culture bound. The question is: how did, and how
does, the particularity of this account not attract criticism? The most likely
explanation is that its contingency is invisible because this ‘‘story’’ is wonderfully
camouflaged. Broadly, Maslow’s ideas*and others, like Erikson, that tell the official
tale of human development*align very finely with neo-liberal ideology. More
specifically, they align with the process of individualisation (Bauman, 2001, 2003;
Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 2002), a process that has been developing its
momentum for hundreds of years but has accelerated over the last 50. In other words,
the incoherence, indeed the ludicrousness, of the fiction is unable to be seen unless
the culture that it expresses is itself able to be identified and then called into question.
Established theories of human development ‘‘make sense’’ in so far as they tell us
what we are well-programed to expect: that growing up is about the drive to
independence. This grandly fraudulent story is a core element in what all Year 12
Psychology students, a cohort that is only second in size to those who enrol in
English, have to learn as if it is an objective, universal fact: the end-point of
development is the realisation of autonomy. Similarly, given that the subjects that are
taught at university level on human development/development across the life cycle
uncritically echo the same fetish around autonomy, the graduates of these programs
will tend towards an attitude that pathologises interpersonal connection*a
disposition that makes sensitive cross-cultural practice next to impossible, as these
practitioners will have a core assumption about human existence that is in conflict
with many of those they seek to work with, including Indigenous Australians.
Human Development
The culturally specific nature of much that is present in the current curricula could be
illustrated across a range of examples (e.g., with respect to the study of human
development, psychopathology, personality). Clearly, such a broad review is beyond
what is possible to achieve in the current exercise; hence, to raise the general
argument, one test case is advanced, one particular ‘‘limb’’, in terms of the discipline’s
body of knowledge: human development. Even this limited focus requires qualifica-
tion, as the current exercise requires an extreme form of summarising. Initially, we
concentrate on a key North American text that is used in several Australian
universities.
Siegler, DeLoache, and Eisenberg’s How Children Develop (2006) is a multiedition,
North American undergraduate standard psychology text. For example, it is the key
prescribed text for all students enrolled in the unit ‘‘human development’’ within the
second year psychology program at the University of Melbourne. On any account,
this book is a ‘‘liberal’’ text, a text that the authors would see as both objective and
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coherent and yet one in which the authors set out to make a progressive input. There
are no overt examples of racism here, no angst about ideology. Moreover, the attempt
is clearly made to treat ‘‘culture’’ benevolently, as a category of attention that can now
be rendered through a neutral, even enlightened, lens. The text seeks to avoid
ideological bias as, one imagines, the authors’ intention is to go to what is fair and
objective. Despite these good intentions, how can the following introductory
comment that is made at the outset of the chapter ‘‘Ethnic Identity’’ be interpreted
without causing the critical reader some disturbance? ‘‘The development of
individuality can present special challenges for minority group adolescents because
it often involves complications related to ethnicity and/or race’’ (Siegler et al., 2006,
p. 436).
This positioning of ‘‘mainstream’’ with ‘‘minority’’ presents two serious difficul-
ties. First, such statements make ‘‘mainstream culture’’ invisible and un-
problematic*a position that is either extremely naı¨ve or, even worse, takes up the
conservative task of championing the status quo. A hundred years ago the playwright
George Bernard Shaw had one of his characters say it is only ‘‘a barbarian’’ who
would ‘‘think that the customs of his tribe and island are the laws of nature’’ (Shaw,
1963, pp. 4546). Here, Siegler et al. (2006) have taken up exactly such an
uncivilised, mono-cultural stance. Second, this positioning acts to make membership
of ‘‘minority cultures’’ [sic] a problem in and of itself. In this example, as with many
others where implicit qualities of the text can be identified by the use of an even
mildly critical attitude, the subtext assumes that it is healthy and desirable for the
developing human to identify with the mainstream*the ‘‘independent variable’’ in
any and all considerations. Further to this point, Siegler et al. (2006, p. 438) stated
that ‘‘minority group members . . . may be faced with difficulty and painful
decisions’’ as to how much, if at all, to continue to identify with their cultures-of-
origin. Who is to say that this is a ‘‘problem’’ for Indigenous people any more or less
than it is for young, indeed for citizens of any age, who have the ‘‘benefit’’ of an
Anglo-Celtic background?
It seems there is an implicit bias in Siegler et al. (2006) towards the assimilation
end of the integration debate: where in this text is it possible to find an
acknowledgment of the pride, rather than the problem, that alternate cultures
represent to their members, as well as to the so-called mainstream? Moreover, if one
was a ‘‘person of colour’’, to use the North American phrase, and was the mother or
father of an offspring who was studying psychology*or if one was that offspring
studying psychology per se*would the above account have the effect of valorising, or
disparaging, one’s particular cultural location? Similarly, the text’s implicit cham-
pioning of integration or assimilation, or both, would not be seen as welcome from
an Indigenous Australian point of view.
In their discussion of human development Siegler et al. (2006) did not specifically
index ‘‘dependence’’ or ‘‘independence’’, and only minimally referenced ‘‘autonomy’’
(with respect to ‘‘autonomous morality’’ in a discussion of Erikson’s psychosocial
theory). Nonetheless, there remains an implicit bias towards ‘‘independence’’, and
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against ‘‘dependence’’, and an implied preference for the developmental goal of
‘‘autonomy’’ immanent in the text. These conjoint values are worked into legitimacy
indirectly, for example, in the recycling of the assumption that self-reliance*what
Harold Bloom (2003, p. 5) characterised as ‘‘that American religion’’*is an inviolate
good. More, ‘‘self-reliance’’ is understood narrowly so that individual economic
productivity, success in the marketplace, is assumed to be a desirable and
unproblematic end in itself. (Between the lines, but made clear to the reader, are
the reasons why some groups are economically backward.)
It is not sound to render the ‘‘host culture’’ invisible in texts that seek to be
technical and objective when, in fact, questions of culture are inevitably at issue
(Furlong, 2003). Unless the variables present in the host culture are identified, an
implicit chauvinism will tend to appear in any text. Here, the authors’ absence of
critical awareness results in the reader receiving the message that the received
narrative, and liberal-democratic cultural practices in general, are more advanced,
more enlightened, more developed, than those from the ‘‘developing world’’. This is a
patronising way of saying that ‘‘we’’ are first-world and ‘‘they’’*those from
‘‘minority cultures’’ *are superstitious, less modern, and so forth. Humming at
the core of the Siegler et al. (2006) text is an abiding, if disavowed, endorsement of
the ascendant cultural values of our time: the idealisation of self-reliance, a virtue that
is founded on the qualities of autonomy, interpersonal separation, an internalised
locus of control, and so forth. For all the effort these authors devote to appearing
neutral, for all the intended benevolence that is directed to questions of culture, the
account of human development that is advanced is not only culture-bound, but
implicitly endorses a particular form of politics; a politics performed, in part but with
significance, in how the particular accounts of the self are to be understood,
constructed, and evaluated.
Human Development in an Australian Social Work Unit
The Siegler et al. (2006) text may embed the idea that certain cultural norms
should be understood as empirical truths, but does this same blight characterise
the Australian social work context with respect to teaching human development?
While there is not the opportunity to examine this question in depth, a perusal of
the most commonly cited reference text, in conjunction with the consideration of
one ‘‘subject outline’’ with which the current authors are familiar, offers a
pessimistic response. Pederson’s (2004) Looking Forward Through the Lifespan is a
hugely popular Australian text and is the core human development text in many
disciplinary programs and in at least one Melbourne social work program. This
text, as does the program’s subject outline, recycles Erikson’s (1980) stages of
development schema as a core learning as if this construction had the same status
as the Periodic Table (or the stone tablets from the mount). As even a
rudimentary inspection shows, Erikson’s schema framed development in relent-
lessly male-stream terms: ‘‘autonomy versus shame and doubt’’; ‘‘initiative versus
guilt’’.
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Moreover, just as the Siegler et al. (2006) text valorised the ‘‘mainstream’’ by
embedding it as the reference point in relation to which ‘‘minority’’ cultures are
judged, Pederson tended to do exactly the same. Under the subheading, ‘‘Cultural
variations in the process of becoming independent’’ Pederson (2004, p. 393)
approvingly quoted research that has proven ‘‘in Anglo-Australian families . . . more
viduality is tolerated . . . [and there is a] greater stress on personal freedom’’ than in
other families. Growing up, it is contended, is a process of ‘‘emancipation’’, even
‘‘liberation’’, where the incorrect practice would be to interfere, to fetter and weigh
down, the holier-than-thou emerging adult. Such an account presents a mono-
cultural protocol for living as if it was an empirical fact. Just as Gilligan (1982) argued
that the supposedly objective research on human moral development that preceded
the feminist critique was inherently sexist so it is that the account of human
development presented by Pederson (2004) is culturally chauvinistic.
Selfhood is a matter that is necessarily contested. It follows that in so far as
selfhood is presented as self-evident and beyond critique, it is to this degree that the
politics undergirding the ideological and discursive position of the speaker will
be disguised. This is especially the case if it is a magisterial author*in this instance
the disembodied, third person voice of the internationally accepted authority
figure*who is asserting that ‘‘the account of human development held up in the
text is what is truly known: it is a knowledge that is possessed by us as the legitimate
experts of what has been discovered to be beyond ideology and culture’’. In our view,
it is not realistic to portend to be nonideological. Rather, it is preferable to say: how
can the cultural location of the speaker/text be made transparent, and as such
therefore made potentially problematic?; How can we, as authors, make clear with
what voice the text speaks*rather than disguising one’s location by way of using a
disembodied, third-person ventriloquism?
In brief, the received Western account of human development has been well-
critiqued (see, e.g., Morss, 1996; Sommers, 1998). Despite the availability of this
scholarship, if graduates have successfully ‘‘passed through’’ a professional socialisa-
tion in how human development should be understood that has been left untouched
by such critiques, it is clear that these people will not be able to learn to practice in a
way that is truly ‘‘culturally competent’’ without first having to reassemble their
understanding of the processes, and indeed the preferred outcomes, of what they have
come to understand as human development. And, we would argue, this same review
is likely to be necessary for other core units, such as personality and psychopathology,
which are also part of our profession’s body of knowledge.
Social work, along with other health and human service disciplines, has embedded
curriculum components that express a particular cultural and ideological location
with respect to the idealisation of autonomy and the denigration of dependence. How
could this not be true given the degree to which social work has fetishised the neo-
liberal values of autonomy, self-determination, choice, and confidentiality as its own
totems?
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An ‘‘Informed Not Knowing’’
Rather than relying on dubious examples of objective knowledge, and the equally
dubious notion that cultural competence is an attitude, skill, or knowledge, or both,
that can be simply added onto the practitioner’s current ‘‘stockpile’’, if the project is
to be able to work well across cultures an alternative position rises-up: why not
deliberately move one’s attitude from a reliance on supposedly static knowledge to an
attitude where I say I am ‘‘not knowing’’ about the other? Initially identified with the
family therapy field (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988), the idea that it is helpful for the
practitioner to regard themselves as ‘‘not-knowing’’ has now become popular, at least
to some degree, in a number of adjacent fields. For example, Ruth Dean (2001) wrote
that:
With ‘‘lack of knowledge’’ as the focus, a different view of practicing across cultures
emerges. The client is the ‘‘expert’’ and the clinician is in a position of seeking
knowledge and trying to understand what life is like for the client. There is no
thought of competence*instead one thinks of gaining understanding (always
partial) of a phenomenon that is evolving and changing. (p. 624)
Refining the idea of ‘‘not knowing’’, Joan Laird (1998) suggested the frame
‘‘informed not-knowing’’ is preferable. In this motif, Laird was arguing that it is
possible for committed outsiders to become aware of generalisations, of possible
categories of interest and comparison, which may be present for a particular group;
yet she argued such stereotypes should not ever be assumed to be universally true.
Keenan (2004) put it this way: ‘‘a stance of informed not knowing [can] mitigate
against essentialism and stereotyping’’ (p. 541). In taking-up this stance it is possible
to see that generalisations may be useful as starting points to one’s curiosity (e.g., in
the construction of questions that make the point of placing ‘‘the other’’ in the role of
expert with respect to their relationship to their own culture). For example, using a
narrative format, a practitioner might seek to draw distinctions that open up new
spaces by asking: ‘‘Can you be a loyal follower of your culture even if you do not
always observe every custom your grandparents were brought up with?’’; ‘‘Do you
always feel comfortable with the way men’s business and women’s work has been
traditionally organised?’’; ‘‘Have your mates ever considered it might be possible to
remain true to the culture while trying out the occasional variation?’’
Activists involved with politics of identity movements, along with those having a
poststructural bent, tend to assert that no one ever has the right to speak for any
other, including those from her/his own group. Certainly, in cultural competence
training, ‘‘experts’’ who speak on behalf of their own groups are not outsiders in
terms of the politics of representation. That said, the approach taken in these
instances does not always call to the diversity in diversity. Modernist or, if one prefers,
minimal notions of cultural competence rely on the production and circulation of
generalisations and the making of grand summary statements. Such compressions
tend to be violent, colonising, and possessing only a pretence of objectivity*qualities
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that disguise a text’s political moment. Rather than recycling this orientation, it seems
far preferable to take an attitude of not-knowing as a starting point, as this position
signals the professional’s acceptance of their one-down status as a learner: ‘‘When we
work towards understanding we are engaging in relationship building’’ (Dean, 2001,
p. 627) instead of being satisfied with the assumption that we are the expert.
The Other as Mirror:
De-centring the Assumption of the Self as a Sovereign Entity
Rather than seeking to identify, reaffirm and reproduce cultural stereotypes, which is
the regressive outcome of the minimalmodernist construct of cultural competence,
a different kind of relationship to practice with diversity is to regard the other’s
difference as a particular kind of gift, one that has the power to act as a mirror for the
practitioner. Meeting with difference gives one the chance to identify, and then to de-
naturalise, one’s location. This location is obviously personal, yet it is also cultural,
ideological, and professional.
Meeting with difference is to engage in a complex dialogue between the personal
and the professional, the technical and the cultural. In so far as this exchange is
genuine, it offers the possibility of (better) identifying, and then interrogating, the
bodies of professional knowledge ‘‘Anglo’’ professionals, researchers and policy
makers tend to take for granted, such as the discourses that have been absorbed on
human development and personality, wellbeing and pathology. Such exchanges go
beyond the technical and the statistical. For example, meetings between Indigenous
Australians and ‘‘Anglo’’ professionals are a gift that de-centres the assumption that
healthy identity is equated with autonomy. This assumption was identified as
problematic more than 25 years ago but it stubbornly remains a principle that
organises personal and cultural experience for the majority of liberaldemocratic
subjects.
Working with indigenous difference can challenge and productively contest the
assumption that the self is a separate entity that must demonstrate clear boundaries,
possess the quality of self-determination, and so forth. This process of contestation
also challenges received understandings of how health and pathology are constructed,
for example, that it is not necessarily pathological to be dependent. (In fact, it is the
case that the healthy person is emotionally, symbolically, and practically ‘‘inter-
dependent’’ rather than independent.)
One practical idea that has the potential to contribute to the quality of engagement
is to consider the distinction between ‘‘low context’’ and ‘‘high context’’ expressions
of culture (mindful that this distinction proposes a binary that can be used in an
essentialist, unhelpful way). Originally formulated by Edward Hall (James, 2008), and
clearly arising in the context of the classical era of anthropology associated with such
figures as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, Hall’s field work in Japan in the 1930s
and 1940s convinced him that Japan was a ‘‘high context’’ culture. High-context
cultures, he proposed, existed where the meaning of beliefs and practices
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were understood implicitly by group members, in effect, making communication of it
less directed (Hall, 1976). James (2008), working with Hall’s concept, suggested that
high-context cultures can be viewed as ‘‘collectivist’’, where ‘‘one’s self-worth and
esteem are tied to the group’’ (p. 28). However, cultures that express meaning in a
low-context manner are said to be more ‘‘individualist’’ (James, 2008, p. 28). Indeed,
low-context cultures were viewed by Hall to have language systems that addressed the
meaning of beliefs and practices quite explicitly. It was upon this projected
dichotomy of cultural difference, which Hall extrapolated, that miscommunication
between cultures could largely be understood. Importantly, Hall (1976) reasoned
that cultural groups might be found to share both high-context and low-context
elements of culture. Taking this further, James (2008) conceptualised how cultural
groups might appear along a continuum of low- and high-context culture (pp. 27
28). This thinking differs from some of the more orthodox takes on cultural
competence, as suggested previously, where Hall’s (1976) concept was referred to in
simply dichotomous terms. Use of this idea for understanding cultural groups can be
found in the literature on cultural competence, although admittedly, it is often
adopted in processes that one way or another essentialise culture (Weaver, 2005).
Discussion
For the reasons presented in the present paper, it is not possible to argue that cultural
competence can be added incrementally to a professional’s existing stock of
knowledge. Irrespective of whether the goal is a specific one (‘‘to be able to practice
‘competently’ with Indigenous Australians’’), or whether the intention is broader (‘‘to
be able to practice well with any presenting example of social diversity’’), we do not
believe the standard, modernist version of cultural competence offers an adequately
proactive engagement with the socially conducted meanings and mechanisms of
difference. Rather than the practitioner, or the qualifying body, being allowed to
consider that a single ‘‘add on’’ is a responsible option, in our view what is required is
that the practitioner has to be willing, and also placed in a supportive milieu within
which it is safe, to de-naturalise their own position (Furlong & Mansell-Lees, 2006).
Being able to de-centre one’s own cultural location entails a complex and dynamic
interrogation of ‘‘where I am coming from’’*a critical dialogue entailing an
engagement with one’s social, cultural, ideological, and professional dimensions.
Of its nature, this dialogue is likely to be, at least from time-to-time, uncomfortable
because such a review de-centres broader cultural biases and privilege.
Further, a genuinely reflective self-critique also means that one has to recognise
the historical specificity, and the colonising effects of, one’s own discipline’s
knowledge and premises*‘‘our’’ assumed-to-be-sensible, right work practices and
our positive professional standing. To the extent that this interrogation is actively
pursued, it follows that it is likely for a condition of sceptical professional
disengagement to result. This (interim) outcome has the potential to undermine,
at least to a degree, the positive identification one has with one’s discipline. For
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example, based on the assumption that the individual is the proper site for clinical
investigation and treatment, standard work practices in psychology, nursing, and the
adjacent allied health disciplines assume that the qualified professional should meet
with the individuals-who-would-be-the-client. Yet, such heroic assumptions do not
fit at all well with Indigenous people, nor with many other cultural groups where the
collective aspects of engagement and treatment are primary; that is, where traditional
services are based on ‘‘individuals being treated’’. Henry, Houston, and Mooney
(2004) observed that this model for health care design, indeed for any human service,
is not respectful of the culture of Indigenous Australians.
Another example of potential incongruence is that traditional services work on a
referral model, whereas Vicary and Andrews (2001) reported that 90% of the
Indigenous people sampled in their study preferred that non Indigenous profes-
sionals were ‘‘vouched for’’ by a cultural insider. The practice of vouching can, of
course, be problematic (see, e.g., Chau, 2007). Yet the larger point is that much that is
established in the standard work protocols of the mainstream professions (e.g., the
establishment of credibility on the basis of qualification; that there is a radical split
between the person of the practitioner and their professional face) are incongruent
with the beliefs of many consumers.
In summary, we have chosen to focus on a particular source of persistent
incongruence: that the person of the client is assumed to be, and is positively imaged
as, a free-standing, self-determining sovereign entity. Using an example of one
subject*‘‘human development’’*from the core undergraduate psychology program
as a test site, we argued that it is possible to illustrate that an historically and
culturally specific imaging of the person has assumed an ascendant position in the
curricula. Other test sites, such as units on personality and psychopathology, could
equally have been selected for review. Unfortunately, for the current purpose it was
only possible to examine one sample unit.
The reader is asked to consider this possibility: in so far as the total of all units in
the curriculum perform this particular and anomalous image of the person*that the
person is a free-standing, self-determining sovereign entity*amounts to a con-
ceptual gestalt into which graduates are professionally socialised, a process that is
potentiated and legitimated precisely because what happens in the specific site of ‘‘my
profession’’ reflects quite precisely the prevailing values of the individualistic, techno-
consumerist larger culture. In our view, the assumption that the person is a free-
standing agent acts as a potent ‘‘rhizome’’ that has come to penetrate, and over time
to significantly structure, the knowledge-base that underpins social work, psychology,
and the other health and community-based disciplines such as psychotherapy. It
could even be said that the assumption about the healthy self as an autonomous
entity is a kind of propriety software.
Given this condition, it is not possible to learn to be culturally competent without
learning to de-centre one’s received discipline-specific and larger cultural knowledge.
Moreover, unless the mono-cultural, and socially divisive (but that is another
matter), premises that underpin one’s discipline can be identified, and then actively
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reformulated at least to a degree, it follows that the disciplines will continue to pass
their pseudo-objective knowledge from one generation of professional to another. In
turn, unless the work practices that attend to this prevailing image of the person as a
free-standing entity are questioned*work practices that are premised on the
privatising expectation that the presenting individual is the site of the problem
and is therefore the proper locus for professional intervention*these practices will
continue to disrupt the prospect of forming adequately intercultural partnership with
Indigenous persons, because they also tend to reproduce processes and outcomes that
further atomise those non Indigenous persons who present to psychologists and
other health professionals.
Conclusion
Mindful of the presence of uncertainties with respect to definition and implementa-
tion, it remains the case that cultural competence is a rubric with many advantages.
Because the notion of cultural competence has advantages*it sounds like it can be
packaged and plausibly on-sold*the frame might be retained for tactical reasons.
Yet, if cultural competence can be packaged and ticked-off as a box that can be, or has
to be, filled in, this aspect is worryingly associated with assumptions that non
Indigenous culture has expertise and knowledge to be understood as neutral,
impersonal commodities. ‘‘We’’ should never be given an excuse to generalise about
‘‘them’’.
The notion of cultural competence can be used as a Trojan horse, a motif that
signals a far deeper kind of cross-cultural engagement than is typical of the ‘‘tick the
box’’ idea of staff redevelopment. For example, the Victorian Aboriginal Child Care
Agency (VACCA) (2009) has a version of cultural competence that stipulates that
‘‘partnership building’’ is one of the five components of cultural competence, not
simply at a ‘‘case-by-case’’ level, but at the interorganisational level. This is a radical
idea, not one that is able to be safely managed. Each non Indigenous person can
repurpose encounters with indigenous difference, asking: ‘‘What do I know’’? ‘‘What
can I learn’’? A key learning, one that can only ever be progressively recycled, is
that these encounters will challenge the received psychology of separation, namely,
that each of us is separate to the other and that having individual choices is an
assumed good. Rather, it is we who are challenged to be more connected and
accountable than our culture has acculturated us to be.
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